Recent historians of wartime Britain and the Attlee years have taught us a great deal about the fundamental role played by popular consumption during this crucial period.
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Haughton has shown how the advertising industry coped with these pressures by proving their usefulness to government during the national emergency. Professional groups such as the Advertising Association and the Incorporated Institute of Practitioners in Advertising worked hard to build links with the Ministry of Information and other government departments with a view to help maintain morale on the home front. 5 However, such initiatives were frequently undermined by commercial self-interest, which fuelled popular mistrust; Excess Profits Tax that was introduced in September 1939, for example, and which froze profits at pre-war levels, was often evaded by manufacturers who preferred to spend profits on advertising goods that were in short supply or even unavailable rather than give more money to the Treasury. Moreover, advertising campaigns that cynically used the experience of war for private gain unsurprisingly generated opprobrium. unnecessary and often deceitful stimulus, remarking; 'advertising as we know it may be dispensed with after the war. We are getting on very well with a greatly diminished volume of commercial advertising in war time, and it is difficult to envisage a return of the 1919-39
conditions in which publicity proliferated.' 6 Tapping into the uncritical pro-Sovietism that was widespread at the time, Thompson went on to praise the U.S.S.R. as 'a country which 3 adopts twentieth-century manufacturing technique without twentieth-century sales talk', and where he believed production for use rather than profit had been successfully established. 7 In this new economy and society he argued, the desire for superfluous luxuries had died out and with it the largely irrational psychological appeals of commercial advertising, to be replaced by rational public information. Thompson work sought to provide a philosophical and historical explanation for the inevitable triumph of 'planning' over the anarchy of laissez faire capitalism. 8 Thompson also feared that advertising, as the vanguard of the commercial domain, was colonising politics more thoroughly than ever before, with ominous results. Nazi Germany was only the logical outcome of a situation where people had not been taught how to think for themselves and where, 'Political discussion is carried on at the advertising level.' 9 Thompson's view seems rather extreme in hindsight but it was not that unusual at the time. Advertising was assailed from many quarters; a Presbyterian minister in Sunderland, the Reverend Wigham Price, even preaching to his flock just after the war about the evils of the modern advertising 'racket', which he described as nothing less than a form of 'Commercial Gangsterdom'. 10 Scholars have frequently drawn attention to the attack on advertising and consumer culture in the late 1950s launched by Leavisites like 4 Richard Hoggart on this side of the Atlantic and economists and writers such as J. K. Advertisers themselves acknowledged the difficulties they faced at the end of the war, and not only from preachers, intellectuals and the labour movement. It was hardly surprising that the editor of Advertiser's Weekly should dismiss Thompson's book as nonsense, no more than a 'fanatical tirade'; or that they should condemn a later intervention by the same writer -dismissively labelled 'the pedagogue' -as nothing more than 'the prejudiced outpouring of a man whose life is spent in the petty kingdom of the schoolroom.' Nevertheless, the periodical also admitted that the most urgent task facing the industry was to bring about its 'rehabilitation' and 'restore faith in advertising'. 
Challenges and opportunities
The advertising industry may have been highly defensive at the end of the war but it was also dynamic and progressive, eager to face the challenges that it confronted. The advertising press worked hard to balance a realistic appreciation of the changed situation with hope for expansion. Government plans for nationalisation generated specific anxieties, while more generally it was feared that opponents of advertising in the Labour Party (and there were many), would force through punitive measures. 23 Guided by Zimmerman, however, the paper tried to make the best of things, publishing the views of advertising men who stressed that it was 'business as usual'. The editor impatiently called for advertisers to 'Snap out of it', to put negative thoughts to one side and adjust to the changed situation. These were 'dog days' for advertising, certainly, but there was no excuse for the defeatism that had spread throughout much of the industry: 'in a profession which specialises in shouting from the housetops we never found so many tongue-tied barkers, so many shy extraverts, so many bashful showmen nor so much whispering in dark places.' Agents ought to take the lead the editor advised, after all, it was they who had developed modern techniques of market research that had an invaluable role to play in state planning. Noting that electors had diverse motives for voting Labour the editor concluded, 'Whatever else the country's decision at the polls means it means a vote for a planned economy.' There was no need, however, to over-react; 'The Labour Party, contrary to popular belief, is not really a Socialist party' and was pledged to work in the interests of both the working and middle classes. The need for the industry to adapt was underlined, then, but Zimmerman was also keen to reassure readers that, 'This is not the end of free enterprise in advertising.'
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The situation on the other side of the Atlantic -where advertising had successfully bounced back -was repeatedly pointed to as a beacon of hope. Writing on the theme of 'Advertising in a Planned Economy', a special correspondent for the paper asserted that people in Britain would also eventually demand 'freedom of choice and ease of availability, rather than pay a large sum in taxes for State-controlled commodities, of limited range, backed by a hoard of inspecting and preventive officials.' The idea that the situation in Britain, however adverse, was temporary and that eventually free market capitalism would inevitably reassert itself, was a running if usually subordinated theme in the immediate 
Conciliation
The advertising industry initially adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Labour government and the policy of austerity and there was widespread recognition that it had to work within and adapt to the new environment. Complaints were constantly made, however, prompted by constraints caused by paper rationing, limits on space devoted to advertising in newspapers and firms' shrinking budgets. Controls were strictly enforced;
fines of £2,350 were imposed on Croydon Advertiser Ltd, for example, when the Ministry of Supply took action against the firm for giving too much space to advertising in its local papers. 33 And signs were that things could get worse. The Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan -who famously described advertising during the debate over the introduction of commercial television in 1953 as 'one of the most evil consequences of a society which is, itself, intrinsically evil' -threatened to tighten further the legislation on patent medicines in 1946, forcing the Advertising Association to produce a tougher revised code. 34 exerted by advertisers who they believed held the so-called free press in thrall. 35 Interestingly, before the war Jay had been in favour of allowing the maximum freedom of choice for consumers (and hence a free rein for advertising), but had come to embrace 'planning' and the subordination of commercial advertising which the idea entailed. 36 The
Royal Commission eventually published its report in 1949 that downplayed overt influence, much to advertisers' relief, but until then the investigation and the threat of government intervention deeply coloured advertisers' attitudes. Pressure on the industry increased as the country's economic position deteriorated still further in 1947; newspapers had to reduce their size by a page from that summer or cut sales, and advertising agents faced substantial increases in rates, less frequent insertions and further reductions in space.
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For its part, the Labour government needed advertisers to help sell austerity and plans for a welfare state to the people, which was why it became the biggest single advertiser after the war. 'Informational' advertising, including press and poster campaigns and documentary films about food safety, the need to increase industrial productivity and reduce waste as well as many other subjects, was therefore discussed extensively in the advertising press. 38 The Ministry of Food's 'crusade' against bread waste was designed to educate consumers about the world food shortage and included 'Battle for Bread' exhibitions in 140 towns. The campaign was directed by the Ministry but it also involved leading agencies such as Mather & Crowther and J. Walter Thompson. 39 The editor of
Advertisers' Weekly often pointed to such activity as proof of the usefulness of the industry against its most vocal critics. But fears remained as many believed that influential Labour 12 politicians and intellectuals who forged policy were implacably opposed to advertising, which they regarded as 'the very head and front of the system of free enterprise' and that if Labour got a second term 'a mortal blow may be struck'. 40 Some advertising men thought that the paper went too far in its efforts to placate opponents and the editor was forced to defend the conciliatory line, which Zimmerman did in no uncertain terms. and, eager to boost exports, addressed the meeting in supportive tones, although he was careful to recommend the importance of 'advertising publicity done in a really first-class way', and stressed that publicity ought to be part of a much wider 'sales relation service.' 43 In a speech to BETRO the year after, Cripps promised government subsidy for the initiative, up to a definite point at least. He also criticised industry for not doing more itself to aid a body that was likely to prove invaluable as the economy changed from a seller's to a buyer's market in which skilled salesmanship would be a necessary requirement. 44 Cripps has often been portrayed as the embodiment of austerity, but this is to simplify. Indeed, this was the label that was attached to him at the time by Lord Woolton, chairman of the Conservative
Party, who used it as a weapon. Cripps may have been against the New Look and the Housewives' League, certainly, but he also dressed smartly and indulged a taste for good 13 cigars, as well as using advertisers' expertise when he believed it to be in the national interest. 45 Significantly enough, Woolton, who as Minister of Food had been responsible for rationing during the war, was awarded the Publicity Club Cup for services to advertising in 1947. 46 The desire to co-operate and conciliate led advertisers to stress repeatedly the importance of putting their own house in order. The advertising press was keen to curb the worst excesses of the industry and promote 'ethical' advertising, remoralise their practice and reassert their professional status, in order to educate the public that advertising was honest as well as indispensable for economic growth. There was much talk of the urgent need to 'restore faith in advertising' and 'rehabilitate' the industry as we have noted. This necessarily involved a good deal of soul searching and owning up to past mistakes. The editor of Advertiser's Weekly emphasised that exaggerated claims in copy, craftily worded sales agreements and the practice of pushing inferior goods had now to be avoided, remarking that 'the stunts of the "foolish thirties"' had lost them much public good will and that there was 'growing consciousness of the consumer that advertising was not always honest.' 46 In similar vein, the advertising manager of The Times, W. R. Balch, observed that people had learnt to make do with substitutes during the war and needed re-educating about brands, but admitted that this would not be easy as people had gone through a period of 'discipline and training' in both the armed forces and industry that they would not have experienced in peacetime, and as a result they were 'critical of private enterprise, and not easily to be persuaded. How to appeal to this new public was the question they had to face.' The best solution, Balch maintained -and many agreed with him -was that advertisers had to clean up their act and only publicise good value, honest commodities. The task of advertising during the last three hundred years...had been to condition the consumer to the rising standard of living made possible by machine production.
It might be that in our own day they were confronted with a change -with the function of conditioning people for a return to a medieval planned economy.
Advertising was essentially involved in the system of capitalistic free enterprise (applause).
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For Bishop, planning was by definition anti-modern and backward looking, 'medieval' in fact.
Advertising on the other hand was integrally bound up with 'free enterprise', which had literally delivered the goods for consumers since the mid-seventeenth century, first in Britain and then in the West more generally, as agricultural and industrial capitalism had spread. 54 The idea that advertising and an expanding economy went hand in hand was also frequently reiterated in the Advertising Association's journal, re-launched to coincide with the Margate Convention. A leading article in the first number denounced government control of advertising that would 'take us back to an unchanging state like that of one of the civilisation's of the Orient, "half as old as time"...a certain way to poverty.' 55 The journal's editor concluded that the key object of the Convention, which had been to get government on side, had failed.
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One of the reasons why advertisers were so anxious about their future was that they were aware that Dalton had wanted to impose a punitive tax on advertisements since the Clarke have argued convincingly that this budget was indeed classic Keynes. 58 Like Dalton, during the depression of the 1930s Cripps had believed that consumer wants should be subordinated under a system of government planning. He criticised the production of luxury goods while the majority experienced scarcity and concluded that 'unless you can plan the whole consumption of a country against its whole production you never can distribute abundance.' 59 However, Cripps's position had become more contradictory by the late 1940s.
Keen to balance the compulsions required by state planning with the individual freedom necessary in a democracy, for example, he sometimes expressed the hope that the Cooperative movement would help regulate consumer demand. 60 As Richard Toye has 18 observed, a 'dictatorship of consumption' was not on his agenda by this time. 61 Nevertheless, and despite such ambiguities, it was little wonder surely that as far as advertisers were concerned, the proposed tax on advertising was another sign of government hostility to free enterprise and the rising tide of planning, which threatened their very raison d'être. press, exhibitions, films and direct mail -and 10,000 copies of the plan were distributed to national advertisers, agencies, retail and trade associations that were asked to sign up. 66 It would be misleading to suggest that Cripps was not keen on this tax or that he backtracked easily, as have a number of historians. 67 The right wing press was naturally delighted when the proposed tax was shelved. The Daily Express had condemned it from the start as an attempt by the state to re-impose the 'taxes on knowledge' which had been abolished in 1853 and underlined the case for advertising's role in promoting economic growth. 68 The Express welcomed Cripps' decision to drop the tax and so did the Daily Mail, though the papers also reported the fact that Cripps had threatened to revive the tax in the Fully understanding that the Chancellor meant business, Pitman was keen to placate
Cripps and assure him that the industry strongly supported the government at this moment of national crisis. 70 And most of the industry duly signed up. By late May 1948 Pitman could report that a total of 196 trade associations, 3,221 individual advertisers, 298 advertising agencies and 375 media owners had lent their support; nearly 400 of those advertisers who regularly spent more than £5,000 per annum, out of a total of less than 600, had already 20 affirmed the plan. 71 However, there were also calls for the voluntary agreement to be dropped as soon as the immediate crisis had passed and this pressure increased from late summer 1948, though Cripps insisted that the plan needed to be extended for another year, despite the fact that the economy picked up slightly and more consumer goods started to appear in the shops. 72 By Christmas the plan was dropped, advertisers congratulating themselves that they had done their bit and proved their usefulness, though the struggle undoubtedly strengthened the belief that the industry would not be safe until Labour had been removed from power. 73 Indeed from this time onwards, the necessity of a specifically ideological campaign against advertising's critics was frequently urged. This was the key theme, for example, of the 'Convention in print' published in Advertiser's Weekly in the summer of 1948. The line now taken was far more combative and less conciliatory than before, the tone shriller. W. D. C. Cormac, for example, warned that the 'barrier of resistance to advertising' encouraged by 'so-called intellectuals' represented, 'the most dangerous menace to our livelihood which has ever existed.' 74 Advertisers mounted a staunch campaign against the threat of taxation and used a number of key arguments in their defence. They maintained predictably that the tax was practically unworkable in many respects and restricted 'freedom of choice' for consumers even more than at present. 75 But the crisis also forced the industry's ideologues to develop reasons that were rather more elevated. Most important, apologists increasingly conflated advertising with democracy. This line was employed before Dalton and Cripps' assault, by the editor of Advertiser's Weekly in autumn 1946, for instance, who asserted that advertising was the 'Basis for Democracy' and that if left-wing moralists and economists like Nicholas Kaldor got their way, 'they will be guilty of pulling down the structure on which democracy, so rightly valued, is dependent'. 76 Early the following year John Nicholas in a 21 lecture to the Publicity Club of London entitled, 'Democracy cannot be made to work without Advertising', distinguished between advertising and propaganda, affinities between which had typically been asserted by the industry's critics. According to Nicholas, while free economies and societies used the former, servile states characterised by dictatorial forms of state planning used the latter. He made the contrast in the most colourful, sexist language he could muster:
If democracy doesn't use advertising, it has to use propaganda -and propaganda is an anonymous lying harlot, a secret and corrupt woman whose brazen and furtive mischief has wrecked Europe more than once. Advertising is not a branch of propaganda...advertising is the corrective of propaganda, the antidote, the prophylactic. Advertising properly used protected the public mind against the wild words of the agitator, against the emotional fevers of the demagogue, against the subtle partisanship of the leader writer, the pamphleteer and the inspired article. 77 Nicolas puffed advertising as a cure-all, quite capable he believed of convincing American citizens of the rightness of the US loan to the British state, or Germans of the necessity of the Occupation, or even 'straightening out the relations between Labour and Capital' domestically. However, the context remained extremely unpropitious and the fact that the Labour government was now spending about £3,000,000 a year on advertising was regarded by many commentators as an ominous sign that it was propaganda that now had the upper hand in Britain, a point also frequently made by Tory leaders such as Lord Woolton, who called for it to be drastically curtailed. In private advertisers worried about the legality of such advertising or if it contravened existing statutes regarding election expenses; in its confidential quarterly bulletin, for example, the Institute of Incorporated Practitioners in Advertising issued members careful advice about how to remain on the right side of the law. 93 The situation was fluid and advertisers were themselves divided on whether they should line up openly on the side of 26 free enterprise, understandable given the fact that many agencies were heavily dependent on government contracts. An editorial in Advertiser's Weekly that appeared a week before the election urged readers to take sides as 'one cannot divorce politics from economics' but also attempted to reconcile such contradictory imperatives. Doubting that a Conservative majority would usher in a 'golden age of advertising' immediately, the alternative continued the editor would be far worse, including the likely introduction of Consumer Advice
Centres. 94 The tone became much more strident after the polls. A front page article declared the result a decisive victory against further nationalisation, strongly implying that anti-nationalisation advertising had had 'some effect on the anti-Socialist vote', and noting approvingly that the campaign would continue in sugar, meat distribution, cold storage and cement. 95 By the summer a decidedly combative stance had been adopted, Zimmerman suggesting that the Advertising Convention that was being planned for the year following 'should be a battle school for advertising as a militant force in the war for a free world.' 96 Though it has been largely overlooked by historians, the attack on commercial advertising that came to a head in 1947 represented a serious challenge to the industry.
Ideologists of advertising interpreted it as such at the time; it convinced them that their industry would never be safe until a Conservative government was returned to power and they worked hard to bring that about. After Cripps reluctantly backed off, they waged a sophisticated, on-going campaign to make advertising respectable and insinuate commercial discourse into political as well as economic life. This was no easy task in the early 1950s.
Heated debate preceded the introduction of commercial television in 1955, for example, which provoked anxieties across the political spectrum. 97 However, the attack on advertising from the labour movement now lacked its earlier focus as part of a more sustained critique 
